The
Ahmad Shah Massoud links with CIA
"The CIA had pumped cash stipends as high as $200,000 a month to Massoud and his Islamic guerrilla organization"
By Steve Coll
Massoud (2nd from left) signing agreement with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the most wanted criminal in
A team of CIA operators from the agency's
They went to a secluded airfield, boarded an old Soviet-made Mi-17 transport helicopter, and swooped toward the jagged, snow-draped peaks of northern
Their aim was to revive secret intelligence and combat operations against bin Laden in partnership with guerrilla commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, leader of the
"We have a common enemy," the CIA team leader told Massoud, according to participants, referring to bin Laden. "Let's work together."
Massoud remained
He was above all an independent man. He surrounded himself with books. He prayed piously, read Persian poetry and studied Islamic theology. During the mid-1990s his militia forces had at times engaged in horrendous massacres, however. American and British drug enforcement officials continued to accuse his men of opium and heroin smuggling.
A series of clandestine CIA teams carrying electronic intercept equipment and relatively small amounts of cash -- up to $250,000 per visit -- began to visit Massoud in the
The
By 1999, Massoud was seen by some at the Pentagon and inside the Clinton Cabinet as a spent force commanding bands of thugs. An inner circle of the Cabinet with access to the most closely guarded secrets was sharply divided over whether the
But at the CIA, especially inside the
This article, detailing the CIA's pursuit of bin Laden from 1999 to 2001, is based on several dozen interviews with participants and officials in the United States, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as well as documents, private records and memoirs about the CIA covert action program in Afghanistan.
A Deal Is Made
Frightened by swelling intelligence reports warning that al Qaeda planned new terrorist strikes, President Bill Clinton's national security adviser, Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger, and his counterterrorism director, Richard Clarke, approved the JAWBREAKER-5 mission. They were uneasy about Massoud but said they were ready to try anything within reason that might lead to bin Laden's capture or death.
Massoud was at war across northern
In dimly lit
Massoud also told the CIA delegation that
"The CIA had pumped cash stipends as high as $200,000 a month to Massoud and his Islamic guerrilla organization, along with weapons and other supplies. Between 1989 and 1991, Schroen had personally delivered some of the cash. But the aid stopped in December 1991."
"Ghost Wars", by Steve Coll
"Even if we succeed in what you are asking for," Massoud told the CIA delegation, his aide and interpreter Abdullah recalled, "that will not solve the bigger problem that is growing."
The CIA officers told Massoud they agreed with his critique, but they had their orders. The
"What was irritating was that in this whole tragedy, in this whole chaotic situation," recalled one of Massoud's intelligence aides who worked closely with the CIA during this period, "they were talking about this very small piece of it: bin Laden. And if you were on our side, it would have been very difficult for you to accept that this was the problem. For us it was an element of the problem but not the problem."
Still, Massoud and his aides agreed they had nothing to lose by helping the CIA. "First of all, it was an effort against a common enemy," recalled Abdullah. "Second, we had the hope that it would get the
Cautioned by History
Massoud had a long and checkered history with the CIA. Among those with the proper security clearances, the accusations and stories of perfidy had become legend.
The CIA first sent Massoud aid in 1984. But their relations were undermined by the CIA's heavy dependence on
In 1990 the CIA's secret relationship with Massoud soured because of a dispute over a $500,000 payment. Gary Schroen, a CIA officer then working from
Schroen, who has now agreed to be publicly identified, renewed contact with Massoud during a solo visit to
Schroen met Massoud again in the spring of 1997 at his new headquarters in Taloqan, in
A series of clandestine CIA teams carrying electronic intercept equipment and relatively small amounts of cash -- up to $250,000 per visit -- began to visit Massoud in the
In 1990 the CIA's secret relationship with Massoud soured because of a dispute over a $500,000 payment. Gary Schroen, a CIA officer then working from
The
Three other teams had gone in by the summer of 1999. The electronic intercept equipment they delivered allowed Massoud to monitor Taliban battlefield radio transmissions. In exchange the CIA officers asked Massoud to let them know immediately if his men ever heard accounts on the Taliban radios indicating that bin Laden or his top lieutenants were on the move in a particular sector.
Given the doubts about Massoud inside the
Massoud was at war with the Taliban. The
At the White House, some national security aides briefed on the CIA's missions feared that, as with the
In the end, the National Security Council approved written guidance to authorize intelligence cooperation with Massoud. But the highly classified documents made clear that the CIA could provide no equipment or assistance that would, as several officials recalled its thrust, "fundamentally alter the Afghan battlefield."
Afghans Seize the Moment
A few months after the JAWBREAKER-5 team choppered out, the CIA's
It was a typical bin Laden facility: crude, mainly dirt and rocks, with a few modest buildings protected by ridges. Massoud's sources reported that no Afghans were permitted in Derunta, only Arabs. Testimony from al Qaeda defectors and interrogation of Arab jihadists showed that Derunta was a graduate school for elite recruits. The Defense Intelligence Agency had relayed reports that bin Laden's aides might be developing chemical weapons or poisons there. The White House's Counterterrorism Security Group, led by Richard Clarke, routed satellites above the camps for surveillance.
The CIA recruited Afghan agents who traveled or lived in the region, an area of heavy smuggling and trade and relatively weak Taliban control. Through their liaison in the Panjshir, CIA officers pushed intelligence-collection equipment to Massoud's southern lines, near Jalalabad. Besides radio intercepts, the technology included an optical device, derived from technology used by offshore spy planes, that could produce photographic images from a distance of more than 10 miles. Massoud's men, with help from CIA officers, set up an overlook above Derunta and tried to watch the place.
The
After the team was on its way, Massoud reported his plan to
The CIA's lawyers convulsed in alarm. The White House legal rules for liaison with Massoud had not addressed such pure military operations against bin Laden. The Massoud partnership was supposed to be about intelligence collection. Now the CIA had, in effect, provided intelligence for a rocket attack on Derunta. The CIA was legally complicit in Massoud's operation, the lawyers feared, and the agency had no authority to be involved.
The bin Laden unit shot a message to the Panjshir: You've got to recall the mission.
Massoud's aides replied, in effect, as a
Taking On the Taliban
During 2000 Massoud planned an expanding military campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda. His strategy was to recruit allies such as the guerrilla leaders Ismail Khan and Abdurrashid Dostum and seed them as pockets of rebellion against Taliban rule in northern and western
Once he had more solid footing in the north, Massoud planned to pursue the same strategy in the Taliban heartland in the south. He hoped to aid ethnic Pashtun rebels such as Hamid Karzai, a former Afghan deputy foreign minister from a prominent royal tribal family who had been forced into exile in
In private talks in person and by satellite telephone, Karzai told Massoud he was ready to slip inside
A Flying Miracle
To pursue his plans in a serious way, Massoud needed helicopters, trucks and other vehicles. Some CIA officers working with Massoud wanted to help him by supplying the mobile equipment, cash, training and weapons he would need to expand his war against the Taliban and al Qaeda. Yet as 2000 passed, the CIA struggled to maintain the basics of its intelligence liaison with Massoud.
It was difficult and risky for the agency's officers to reach the
Even on the best days, the choppers would shake and rattle and the cabin would fill with the smell of fuel. The overland routes were no better. When a CIA team drove in from
...US kept Massoud and his resistance at arm's length, perhaps because they were receiving weapons from
Paul Wolf, GlobalResearch.ca,
These reports accumulated on the desk of Deputy Director of Operations James Pavitt, who had overall responsibility for CIA espionage. Pavitt was a blue-eyed, white-haired former case officer and station chief who had served in
Those opposed to the Panjshir missions argued, as one official recalled it, "You're sending people to their deaths."
The agency sent out a team of mechanics knowledgeable about Russian helicopters. When Massoud's men opened up one of the Mi-17s, the mechanics were stunned: They had patched an engine originally made for a Hind attack helicopter into the bay of the Mi-17 transport. It was a flying miracle.
Afterward Tenet signed off on a compromise: The CIA would secretly buy its own airworthy Mi-17 helicopter, maintain it properly in
But the helicopter issue was a symptom of a larger problem. By the late summer of 2000, the CIA's liaison with Massoud was fraying on both sides.
Frustrated by daunting geography and unable to win support for Massoud in Cabinet debates, the CIA's officers felt stifled. For their part, Massoud's aides had hoped their work with the agency would lead to clearer recognition of
Instead they were badgered repeatedly about mounting a "
Massoud's men asked their CIA counterparts, as this intelligence aide recalled it: "Is there any policy in the government of the American states to help
Disappointments for Massoud
Massoud, Lion of the Kremlin
Massoud's veneration by leftists in the French press as the fabled "Lion of the Pansher" would be laughable were it not for the desperate condition of the Afghan people. The truth be known, Massoud is not a Lion of the Pansher but a Lion of the Kremlin.
At this point in history, there exists more than 25 books written by Russian, Afghan, British, Finnish, Ukrainian and American journalists and authors that attests to Massoud's collaboration, treason and butchery against his own Afghan people.
We all realize the fact of Massoud's support from the French press during the Jihad period and we all realize and understand the motivation behind this support. Massoud understood public relations and imagery and was clever enough to receive French journalists and bestow gifts of lapis lazuli and emeralds upon them understanding full well that this would warrant positive reports from them in their respective journals. It has often been argued by Massoud's supporters that these enterprising journalists did not witness Massoud's agreements with the Soviets and therefore they must not have taken place. But I would argue that the evidence dictates otherwise. Massoud did sign agreements with the Soviets as early as 1980 and not only gave written assurance to protect their lines of supply and communication but to also fight other Mujahideen groups who were atacking Soviet targets. I would also argue that Massoud would not conduct negotiations or sign agreements with the Soviets when Western journalists were in attendance in order to maintain his personna as the mythical Lion of the Panjsher.
As we know, the West loves a hero. Massoud, aided and abetted by his propagandists and the French press, gave them precisely what they wanted, a mythical Afghan hero who stood in defiance to the mighty Red Army. Thus the beginning of the fable as our intrepid correspondents returned home to write glowing articles oblivious to their distortion of history.
Each day brings new revelations about Massoud's link to
Bruce G. Richardson, July 4, 2001
After the terrorist bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000, in which 17 sailors were killed at
The list of covert supplies they proposed for Massoud would cost between $50 million and $150 million, depending on how aggressive the White House wanted to be.
Under the plan, the CIA would establish a permanent base with Massoud in the
The CIA wanted to overcome the confusion and mutual mistrust that had developed with Massoud over operations designed to capture or kill bin Laden. The plan envisioned that CIA officers would go directly into action alongside the
In the late autumn, Clarke sent a memo outlining the CIA's proposal to Berger,
The word went back to the
As the Bush administration took office early in 2001, Massoud retained a
His CIA liaison had slackened, but his intelligence aides still spoke and exchanged messages frequently with
Gary Schroen and Rich flew to
Massoud told them that he thought he could defend his lines in the northeast of
"If President Bush doesn't help us," Massoud told reporters in
A Fatal Blow
Early in September 2001, Massoud's intelligence service transmitted a routine classified report to the CIA's
The intelligence-sharing between Massoud and the CIA concentrated mainly on Arabs and foreigners in
Members of the Bush Cabinet met at the White House on Sept. 4. Before them was a draft copy of a National Security Presidential Directive, a classified memo outlining a new
It had been many months in the drafting. The Bush administration's senior national security team had not begun to focus on al Qaeda until April, about three months after taking office. They did not forge a policy approach until July. Then they took still more weeks to schedule a meeting to ratify their plans.
Among other things, the draft document revived almost in its entirety the CIA plan to aid Massoud that had been forwarded to the lame-duck Clinton White House -- and rejected -- nine months earlier. The stated goal of the draft was to eliminate bin Laden and his organization. The plan called for the CIA to supply Massoud with a large but undetermined sum for covert action to support his war against the Taliban, as well as trucks, uniforms, ammunition, mortars, helicopters and other equipment. The Bush Cabinet approved this part of the draft document.
Other aspects of the Bush administration's al Qaeda policy, such as its approach to the use of armed Predator surveillance drones for the hunt, remained unresolved after the Sept. 4 debate. But on Massoud, the CIA was told that it could at least start the paperwork for a new covert policy -- the first in a decade that sought to influence the course of the Afghan war.
In the
As one of them set up a television camera, the other read aloud a list of questions he intended to ask. About half of them concerned bin Laden.
A bomb secretly packed in the television equipment ripped the cameraman's body apart. It shattered the room's windows, seared the walls in flame and tore Massoud's chest with shrapnel.
Hours later, after Massoud had been evacuated to
Three weeks before the Soviet tanks began to roll, American spy satellites detected movements that allowed agents to warn the rebels of the impending attack. Massoud's radio performance was made possible by the use of more than 40 CIA-supplied portable transmitters. In response to a specific request from Massoud, the CIA also arranged to send hundreds of land mines by plane, ship, truck, camel and pony across three continents and through several intermediaries, so that they got into rebel hands just before Goodbye Massoud began. The thwarting of Goodbye Massoud was the most recent, and perhaps the most daring, success of the CIA's operation to assist the embattled guerrillas.
The
"Where's Massoud?" the CIA officer asked.
"He's in the refrigerator," said Saleh, searching for the English word for morgue.
Massoud was dead, but members of his inner circle had barely absorbed the news. They were all in shock. They were also trying to strategize in a hurry. They had already put out a false story claiming that Massoud had only been wounded. Meanwhile, Saleh told the
On the morning of Sept. 10, the CIA's daily classified briefings to Bush, his Cabinet and other policymakers reported on Massoud's death and analyzed the consequences for the
Officers in the Counterterrorist Center, still hopeful that they could maintain a foothold in northern Afghanistan to attack bin Laden, called frantically around Washington to find a way to aid the rump Northern Alliance before it was eliminated.
Massoud's advisers and lobbyists, playing for time, tried to promote speculation that Massoud might still be alive. But privately, as Sept. 10 wore on, phone call by phone call, many of the Afghans closest to the commander began to learn that he was gone.
Karzai, who was in
Karzai's brother said it was confirmed: Ahmed Shah Massoud was dead.
Karzai reacted in a single, brief sentence, as his brother recalled it: "What an unlucky country."
Staff writer Griff Witte contributed to this report.
- How the CIA supports and supplies the anti-Soviet guerrillas (Time Magazine, Jun. 11, 1984)
- The Afghan Who Wouldn't Fight (Ahmad Shah Massoud's links with the Russians)
- Ex-Soviet commander unveil Masoud's secret pact
- AI condemns execution of 6 people by forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud
- Ahmad Shah Masoud: The Janos Savambi of Afghanistan
- Masoud and the killing of 85 educated men of Panjsheer
- Is Ahmad Shah Masood a legitimate candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize?
- 5,000 were killed in 25 days of continued fighting in Kabul in Feb 1993
- Felix Ermacora: 10,000 killed in 8 months in Kabul
- Masoud joins hands with India
- Russia gives 3 coptors to Ahmad Shah Masoud
- Ahmad Shah Masoud provides shelter to most wanted terrorists
- Masoud gunmen in action after entering Kabul in 1992
- Public execution by Rabbani-Masoud government in 1992
- Gunmen of Masoud burn books in Kabul University in 1993
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